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In Western Societies, deterrent models of crime and punishment that utilize 
institutional methods of labeling wrongdoers have been a historically popular means 
of regulating crimes against the state, the ruling class, and society.  In these systems, 
an offender who commits a crime will be deemed an outlaw, labeled by society as 
such, and punished accordingly in order to discourage the repetition of their acts for 
both the benefit and punishment of the wrongdoer—and any others who might think 
to perpetrate similar crimes.  These systems of punishment have historically entailed a 
loss of substantive rights thought to be granted by citizenship.  In the United States, 
the right to vote is considered to be one of the most fundamental rights.  However, 
states have leveraged their constitutional powers to continually disenfranchise millions 
of voters by modifying qualifications to vote and forbidding felons and ex-felons from 
participating in the electoral process.  Today, over 6.1 million Americans cannot vote 
because of a felony conviction.1  This phenomenon disproportionately impacts African 
Americans, who have lost their rights to vote at a proportion of one out of every 
thirteen (1:13), compared to one out of every fifty-six (1:56) non-black voters.2 
This Note explores the dynamics of voting disenfranchisement and its relationship 
to potential discriminatory practices by the states.  This Note will argue that 
disenfranchisement is antithetical to the democratic values held in the United States.  
This issue will be examined through the lens of over-incarceration as it relates to 
protected classes under the Civil Rights Act (“CRA”) and Voting Rights Act (“VRA”).  
Additionally, this Note will examine the discriminatory effects that over-incarceration 
has had on these protected classes, in direct contradiction to the intentions of the VRA, 
and will argue for a uniform national standard of disenfranchisement and the transfer 
of control over the vote to the federal government.  
Part I of this Note will provide an exploration of the deep history behind the 
practice of voter disenfranchisement.  Part II will discuss the Voting Rights Act, 
including a more in-depth discussion of its history and purpose, and the specific 
provisions relevant to a discussion of the potentially unconstitutional principles upheld 
by modern disenfranchisement practices.  Part III will discuss the discriminatory 
impact of the principles discussed in Part II, while Part IV will examine the different 
approaches and effects of policy adopted by the various states.  Part V will examine 
the most practical solution to ending the practice of criminal disenfranchisement and 
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1 See JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 3 (2018). 
2 Id. at 6.  The 1 in 13 figures is national and varies by state.  African Americans are disenfranchised at a 
rate of 1 in 5 in Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id. 
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I. HISTORY BEHIND THE PRACTICE OF VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
 
From 1100 B.C. to the 16th century, societies in Ancient Greece, Rome, and 
Medieval Europe implemented the punishment of “Civil Death.”3  In Ancient Greece, 
this punishment changed a criminal offender’s societal standing to “Atimia,” or 
“without honor.”4  A criminal status in Greece resulted in the loss of most rights of 
citizenship, including the right to participate in “polis,” the collective political body of 
democratic Greek society.5  Rome employed a similar punishment known as 
“infamia,” which principally involved a Roman citizen’s loss of the right to vote and 
his right to serve in the Roman Legions—the most prominent mode of advancement 
for a Roman citizen.6  European societies of the 16th century continued to use these 
punishments, stripping wrongdoers of their citizenship rights.  In Medieval societies, 
this status was potentially dangerous for those who carried the label, as many societies 
allowed an outlaw to be killed and his or her property seized without punishment.7  
 The civil punishments of ancient and medieval societies formed the roots of 
English law, and these legal principles were carried to the Americas through the British 
colonies.  During the revolutionary period, there was great debate over whether the 
vote was a right or privilege in the colonies, which would eventually form the United 
States.8  Suffrage laws were, at this time, applied without any set of cohesive standards 
and varied by colony.  Many felt voting was a privilege that could be granted or taken 
away by the State, and argued that the treatment of voting as a natural right would 
cause harm to society.9  If the right to suffrage was indeed a natural one, then each 
individual in society would have the right to it, including indentured servants, men 
who did not own land, and potentially slaves.10  Many of America’s founders would 
later argue against the vision of voting as a natural right, citing it as a path toward “rule 
by the mob.”11  
 After the Revolutionary War, the Constitution delegated the right to vote in 
national elections to state suffrage laws.12  This stance was a compromise meant to 
uphold principles of federalism.  Citizenship in the newly formed United States would 
be controlled by a federal government, but states would retain control over the right to 
vote and, thus, control who represented their interests in the newly formed federal 
government.13  There was no effort to create a more inclusive national system, as it 
 
3 See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 22–23 (1996).  
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 7-9 (2000) (“One [consideration] was the ‘stake in society’ notion inherited from the colonial 
period.  Only men with property . . . were deemed to be sufficiently attached to the community and sufficiently 
affected by its laws to have earned the privilege of voting.”). 
9 Id. at 9.  
10 Id. at 12-13 (“[T]here was no way to argue that voting was a right . . . without opening a Pandora’s box.  
If voting was a natural right, then everyone should possess it.  Did this mean that not just every man . . . should 
vote, but women as well?”). 
11 Id. at 2.  
12 Id. at 8.  
13 Id. at 18-19.  
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was not a popular view at the time to make the system of government increasingly 
democratic.14  
 On April 19, 1792, the state of Kentucky became the first to include criminal 
disenfranchisement provisions in its state constitution.15  Other states would follow 
suit.  By 1869, twenty-nine states had ratified provisions establishing the ability of the 
state to revoke a citizen’s privilege to vote.16  Notably, the federal government would 
encroach on the state’s monopoly on voting rights with the Fifteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution—forbidding disenfranchisement based on race.17  However, 
criminal disenfranchisement would continue to remain in the hands of the states, some 
of which exploited their power to maintain racial supremacy or achieve other goals 
against undesired classes of voters.18  The federal government attempted to take action 
against such methods in 1957 when President Eisenhower signed the Civil Rights Act 
into law.19  
The federal government would continue to expand voting rights through the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).20  The VRA “applied a nationwide prohibition 
against the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on the literacy [and other] tests 
on a nationwide basis.”21  It specifically targeted many states that Congress believed 
to be using discriminatory voting practices.  The VRA was designed to expand the 
electorate in these states by prohibiting what the government perceived as unfair 
mechanisms for disenfranchisement used to constrict the electorate in states with 
discriminatory agendas.22  The passage of the VRA would enable more African 
Americans to register to vote than at any other time in American history, but it did not 
reduce or modify state powers over criminal disenfranchisement.23  
Although the VRA was initially enacted as a prohibition against narrowly defined 
discriminatory voting practices, such as literacy tests, it became the centerpiece for 
arguments against criminal disenfranchisement—especially after its language was 
changed in 1982 to prohibit voting restrictions with a racially discriminatory impact.24  
This change in language sparked the creation of numerous contradicting court opinions 
on the matter.  In the first landmark case on the issue, Green v. Board of Elections, the 
 
14 Id. at 19.  
15 KY. CONST. of 1792, ART. VIII, § 2 (1792) (“Laws shall be made to exclude from . . . suffrage those who 
. . . be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”). 
16 See JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 3 (2018).  
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.  
18See Eric Holder, Jr., Voting Rights: The Struggle of Our Lifetime, HARV. L. REV. BLOG  (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/voting-rights-the-struggle-of-our-lifetime/ (Discussing the laws passed by 
states “imposing poll taxes, literacy tests, and property requirements as prerequisites to voting.”). 
19 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315 §104(a), 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (creating a commission which would “investigate allegations . . 
. that certain citizens of the United States are being deprived of their right to vote . . . by reason of their color, 
race, religion, or national origin[.]”). Importantly, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 allowed African Americans to 
sue through the authority of the U.S. Attorney General if their right to vote was unjustly denied.   
20 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (hereinafter, VRA of 1965).   
21 History of Federal Voting Rights Laws: The Voting Rights Act of 1965, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). 
22 Id.  
23 VRA of 1965 §2 (forbidding the implementation of standards that “deny or abridge the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color”) (The bill’s narrower standard of specific 
discriminatory voting practices made it difficult for plaintiffs to link racially discriminatory law enforcement 
practices with the VRA).  
24 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205 §2(b)(A), 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982). 
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New York Supreme Court held that such disenfranchisement statutes are 
constitutional.25  The court stated that:  
 
[A] man who breaks the laws . . . could fairly have been thought to have 
abandoned the right to participate in further administering the compact . . 
. . It can scarcely be deemed reasonable for a state to decide that 
perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators 
who make the laws . . . .26 
 
However, the Ninth Circuit in its 1972 case, Dillenburg v. Kramer, was the first to 
hold that laws disenfranchising criminals were no longer “immune from attack.”27  
The court noted that the concepts enshrined in the Constitution should continue to 
develop alongside modern ideals of justice.28  It also noted that the state interest in 
disenfranchisement of criminals is difficult to define, and that the age-old practice of 
disenfranchisement is not necessarily held to be rational by modern principles of 
punishment.29  
In 1974, the Supreme Court responded in Richardson v. Ramirez and held that 
the disenfranchisement of convicted felons, who have completed their sentences and 
paroles, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.30  The Supreme Court maintained 
its emphasis on racial discrimination as the sole basis for disenfranchisement being 
held unconstitutional.  In Mobile v. Bolden, the Court held that actions must be taken 
with “racially discriminatory motivation” to be determined unconstitutional under the 
Voting Rights Act.31  The Court reinforced its decision in Bolden through its 1985 
decision in the case of Hunter v. Underwood, where it ruled 8-0 that states maintained 
their uncontested right to disenfranchise criminals “[without] racially discriminatory 
intent.”32 
Some states took matters into their own hands by passing provisions to restore 
the voting rights of felons, but by the year 2000, it seemed clear that criminal 
disenfranchisement was firmly beholden to the states.  The Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to try the issue, and the federal government has made few significant 
attempts to address it.33   
 
25 Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir. 1967).  
26 Id. at 451.  
27 Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1972).  
28 Id. (“[C]onstitutional concepts . . . are not immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian amber.  
‘Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.’”) (citing 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966)). 
29 Id. at 1224 (“Courts have been hard pressed to define the state interest served by laws disenfranchising 
persons convicted of crimes.”).  
30 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 75-76 (1974) (noting that the practice of criminal 
disenfranchisement has been historically practiced and accepted and is therefore not discriminatory).    
31 Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1979) (discussing an electoral system that was organized such that 
no African American ever served as a City Commissioner.  The Court held that a voting system is not 
unconstitutional unless intentionally designed to minimize minority voting power without separate proof of 
specific discriminatory intent.).  
32 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)).  
33 E.g. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 3, at 48-49 (discussing a 2002 vote in the U.S. Senate in which 
amendments to federal voting reform legislation intended to restore voting rights to ex-felons in federal 
elections was struck down sixty-three to thirty-one.  The author noted that “senators from the eleven former 
confederate states voted eighteen to four against the provision, and that the most passionate speeches against it 
were made by southerners . . . .”).   
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The developments in this area of law are troubling.  The rights granted by the 
VRA to protected classes have come under an indirect line of fire: criminal 
incarceration.  Arguably, the increasing rates of minority incarceration serve as a new 
substitute for the racially based means of voting discrimination that have been used 
historically in the United States.  As the Ninth Circuit in Dillenburg noted,34 
constitutional concepts change.  It is time to question the modern efficacy of allowing 
the states to have total control of criminal disenfranchisement.  
 
II. THE EFFECTS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT  
 
Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, native-born Americans 
were unilaterally granted citizenship, ending the practice of chattel-slavery 
nationwide.35  The Act would secure Lincoln’s legacy as the president who freed the 
slaves, but it failed to secure the right to vote for an entirely new demographic of 
American citizens.  Congress remedied this issue in 1869 with the passage of the 
Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, granting African American men the 
right to vote.36  
The successful passage of the Fifteenth Amendment was a momentous 
achievement in U.S. history, but African Americans in the South would continue to 
face tremendous obstacles as they attempted to exercise their newfound right to vote.  
State governments in the South employed  numerous restrictions to deny African 
Americans the right to vote, such as poll taxes and literacy tests.37  These states also 
enacted grandfather clauses, which allowed White voters who already held voting 
rights to circumvent new voting requirements.38  Voting registration figures for former 
slaves were significantly reduced after these clauses were passed, dropping in 
Louisiana from 44.8 percent in 1896 to 4 percent in 1900.39  By 1940, only 3 percent 
 
34 Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1972).  
35 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 
140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1987) (“That all persons born in the United 
States and not subject to any foreign power . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such 
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . 
. shall have the same right, in every State and territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts; to 
sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, 
and to full equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by 
white citizens . . .”)).   
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).  
37 See LA. CONST. of 1898, ART. CXCVII , § 3 (1898) (“He shall be able to read and write, and shall 
demonstrate his ability to do so when he applies for registration . . . in the English language, or his mother 
tongue . . . application shall contain the essential facts necessary to show that he is entitled to register and vote, 
and shall be entirely written, dated and signed by him, in the presence of the registration officer . . . without 
assistance or suggestion from any person . . . );  see also id. at § 4 (specifying that individuals who cannot read 
and/or write may still vote if he possesses more than three hundred dollars of property with all applicable taxes 
paid); LA. CONST. of 1898, ART. CXCVIII (1898) (instituting a poll tax for all state citizens under the age of 60);  
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: MAJOR DATES IN HISTORY, A History of the Voting Rights Act (last visited Nov. 12, 
2018), https://www.aclu.org/issues/voting-rights/voting-rights-act/history-voting-rights-act (hereinafter, ACLU 
VRA TIMELINE). 
38 ACLU VRA TIMELINE, supra note 37; see also VOTING RIGHTS ACT (1965) PUB. L. 89-110, 79 STAT. 
437, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=100 (providing a PDF copy of the VRA of 1965 
and offering additional insights and information about the history of the document).  
39 See sources cited supra note 38. 
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of eligible African Americans in the South were registered to vote.40  Additionally, 
physical violence directed toward African Americans at polling locations was not 
uncommon in the South. 
Voting rights would become a central issue in the American Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.  The issue rose to national prominence in 1964, 
after an attack by state troopers on marchers in Selma, Alabama—an incident which 
ultimately prompted both President Lyndon B. Johnson and Congress to draft and pass 
legislation that would guarantee voting rights for African Americans.41  The Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 was passed and signed quickly.  It banned literacy tests and 
implemented a statistical formula42 to appoint federal examiners in jurisdictions that 
were considered to be at a high risk of utilizing voter suppression tactics.43  
Importantly, the Act’s Fifth Section required these jurisdictions to request permission 
from the U.S. Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia to 
enact new practices or procedures relating to the right to vote.44  The Act’s Second 
Section prohibited the denial or abridgement of voting rights on the basis of race or 
color, mirroring the language of the Fifteenth Amendment.45  Additionally, while poll 
taxes had been abolished in the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
the VRA required the Attorney General to challenge the use of poll taxes in state and 
local elections.46  After the Supreme Court’s 1966 ruling in Harper v. Virginia State 
Board of Elections, poll taxes became an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,47 which ensured that they would never again be put to use.  
The VRA granted the federal government significant leverage over the right to 
vote, a vestige of power that had long been held by the states.  The Act would face its 
share of challenges in court.  From 1965-1969, the Act was the subject of high-profile 
litigation.48  In these cases, the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s constitutionality.  
Specifically, the Court upheld Section Five’s permission provision, thereby clarifying 
and upholding the wide range of voting practices that required preclearance.49  The Act 
 
40 ACLU VRA TIMELINE, supra note 37. 
41 US House History, Bridging History: Selma and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, YOUTUBE (Aug. 3, 
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URMb2D3kFZQ.  
42 VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, supra note 38 (discussing public pressures leading to the creation of the 
VRA).  
43 Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-
rights-act (last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (explaining that prior to Holder, the formula in § 4 of the VRA 
determined whether a state in question utilized a test or device to reduce registration or voting and/or registered 
under 50% of eligible voters.  States that met these criteria would be supervised by appointed Federal 
Examiners to ensure that they did not attempt to undermine the VRA.). 
44 VRA of 1965 § 5 (requiring covered jurisdictions to request permission for any potential changes to 
voting requirements or law from the federal government).  
45 VRA of 1965 § 2 (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color.”). 
46 Id. (providing that a State seeking to enact new voting qualifications or standards is subject to a 
declaratory judgement that the qualification or standard does not have the purpose or effect of denying or 
abridging voting rights on account of race, and that a declaratory judgement is not necessary only if the State 
seeking to enact those qualifications submits them to the Attorney General for approval).  
47 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that voter eligibility has no 
connection to individual wealth, and that a poll tax could not pass Constitutional muster when voting is viewed 
as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
48 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1966); see Allen v. State Board of Elections, 
393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
49 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327-28 (holding that the 15th amendment gave Congress full power to 
prevent discrimination in voting); see generally Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (holding 
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was an immense success.  Within a year of its passage, two-hundred-and-fifty thousand 
African American voters were registered.  The number of registered voters increased 
most significantly in the South, where over half of Black voters were registered to vote 
in a majority of the southern states.50  
The VRA remains a cornerstone of American voting legislation, having been 
extended and expanded in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006.51  The VRA secured the right 
to vote for oppressed peoples and effectively increased the federal government’s power 
over determining who was eligible to vote.  
However, while the VRA has generally expanded voting rights, these expansions 
are not irreversible.  The VRA fails to recognize voting as a natural right, and thus, 
voting remains a right that can be taken away—should the rhetoric toward voting at 
the federal level change.  And recent decisions in the Supreme Court have indicated a 
less favorable position toward the protections offered in the VRA, returning a 
significant amount of policy-autonomy to the states.  
In Alabama v. Holder, the Supreme Court effectively rendered Section Five of the 
VRA inapplicable by holding that the coverage formula in Section 4(b), used to 
determine which states must ask for preclearance, was an unconstitutional violation of 
the Tenth Amendment’s guarantee of state autonomy.52  After the decision in Holder, 
thirty-four states modified voter identification laws.  These laws have created potential 
obstacles for demographics that some scholars identify as primarily democratic, 
notably minorities, low-income individuals, and college students.53  In Texas, college 
students cannot vote using their college ID, but can use it to purchase guns.54  North 
Carolina eliminated same-day voting registration as well as weekend and early 
voting.55  Some states have moved polling precincts to areas without access to public 
transportation.56  Others have enacted laws requiring a driver’s license to display an 
exact name, an issue for recently divorced or married women.57  Such changes affect 
minority voters more than other demographics, since they tend to be lower-income and 
face difficulties in, first, becoming informed of these changes and, second, being able 
to adapt to them.58  
Most importantly, the VRA left state dominance in the realm of criminal 
disenfranchisement virtually unchanged,59 a balance of power that some scholars have 
 
that Congress intended for even minute changes in voting practices to be subject to VRA § 5 permission and 
approval).  
50 VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, supra note 38 (discussing the impact of the VRA on voter registration in 
the South).  
51 ACLU VRA TIMELINE, supra note 37. 
52 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (holding that VRA § 4’s coverage formula used to 
determine which states must ask for preclearance before changing voting qualifications is unconstitutional by 
virtue of being based on data that is on longer responsive to current needs. VRA § 5 was no stricken but cannot 
be applied until a new coverage formula is approved by Congress).  
53 Maxine Bryant & Becky K. da Cruz, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Voting Rights Act Fifty Years 
Later, LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE FORUM, 64, 67 (2016).  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 See Same Day Voter Registration, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) 
(concluding that there is significant evidence that same day registration increases turnout for voters, 
acknowledging that the extent of that effect is difficult to conclude, summarizing the process for same-day 
registration in each state that allows the practice).  
59 See VRA of 1965 § 2 (The second section of the VRA has been central to disenfranchisement litigation.  
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argued has been used to suppress the vote.  The United States leads industrialized 
nations in restrictive disenfranchisement policies for criminals.60  The current practice 
of mass incarceration, characterized as the long-term and large-scale imprisonment of 
Americans for generally non-violent offenses, has led to the revocation of voting rights 
for millions of American citizens.61  Disenfranchisement penalties are codified 
primarily through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Second Section, a provision the 
Supreme Court held to be constitutional in the 1975 case of Richardson v. Ramirez.62  
Such policies allow governments at both the state and federal level to create 
punishments beyond incarceration, often extending punishments for felonies past the 
confines of the criminal justice system, a tradition that has long included a revocation 
of voting rights.63  
Disenfranchisement has been linked to racial factors.  Statistics have demonstrated 
that African-Americans are punished at a higher rate and severity than White citizens 
committing identical crimes.64  Multiple research organizations have found that 
incarceration is focused, primarily, on males belonging to minority cultures or 
ethnicities.65  Within this demographic, Black males are incarcerated at the highest 
rate.  Black females are incarcerated at a higher proportion as well.66  African 
Americans compose roughly 50 percent of the total population of incarcerated 
Americans.67  That figure increases when accounting for individuals who remain under 
supervision outside of prison, such as individuals on parole.68 
These findings are troubling, as states with a higher percentage of minority 
prisoners adopt felon disenfranchisement policies at a higher rate.69  Policymakers 
have denied that such policies have any racial bias, but statistics continue to 
demonstrate that Black people and other minorities are put in prison at a consistently 
higher rate than White people.  Voting is simply more difficult in the South for those 
who have been incarcerated and, by extension, minority voters.  Southern states have 
large populations of Black voters, incarcerate minorities at a higher rate, are more 
likely to restrict voting demographics through policy,70 and have now been given free 
license by the Supreme Court to institute such policies after Holder.  
 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has looked beyond the plain text of the statute and cites numerous external reasons 
for the acceptability of criminal disenfranchisement.).  
60 See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 3.  
61 See Ronnie B. Tucker, Sr., The Color of Mass Incarceration, 37-38 SHIPPENSBURG UNIVERSITY ETH. 
STUD. REV. 135, 136-37 (2016) (providing a comprehensive definition of mass incarceration while noting that 
the term is broad and inclusive).  
62 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (discussing three felons who argued that they had the right 
to register to vote after repaying their debt to society by completing the requirements of their prison sentences).  
63 Angela Behrens, Jeff Manza, & Christopher Uggen, Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro 
Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
SOCIOLOGY, 1850-2002 (2002) (utilizing “theories of group threat” in order to test “whether racial threat 
influenced [state felon disenfranchisement provision’s] passage, finding that “large nonwhite prison populations 
increase the odds of passing restrictive laws. . . .”).  
64 Bryant & Cruz, supra note 53, at 69 (citing a PEW study disclosing these statistics confirmed by a 
separate NAACP study).   
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. African Americans account for roughly 1 million out of the 2.3 million persons in the prison 
population. Id.   
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 Alabama’s plans to close nearly half of its driver’s license offices primarily in poor areas where 
residents lacked public transportation access and drivers’ licenses.  The closures disproportionately affected 
Democratic counties and counties which voted for President Obama in the 2012 election.  Id. at 68. 
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Additionally, there is racial bias in re-enfranchisement practices and vote-
counting.  In states which offer a voting-restoration process without a guarantee of 
acceptance for such requests, White applicants were granted approval at a higher rate 
than persons of color.71  Further, felons, both incarcerated and released, are counted in 
the U.S. census among the population in the voting district where the prison is located 
rather than as citizens of the state or township in which they lived prior to 
incarceration.72  Such practices create difficulty for minority populations through 
gerrymandering.  These policies weaken the power of minority voters in 
gerrymandered districts by decreasing their represented population, while distributing 
their population through the prison system to other, often more conservative, districts 
where the prisons are located.73 
In their totality, the practices and policies discussed in this section have been 
devastating for certain demographics of American voters.  Nearly 5.3 million 
Americans cannot vote due to a past felony conviction.74  Importantly, 
disenfranchisement occurs unequally due, in large part, to the uneven nature of 
incarceration in United States prisons—where African Americans compose nearly 40 
percent of the incarcerated population.75  Disenfranchisement practices in the U.S. 
have also run contrary to the popular global view on voting rights, where the right to 
vote tends to be viewed as a natural rather than a granted right.76  Most importantly, 
disenfranchisement practices have arguably undermined American democracy, 
leaving enormous swathes of U.S. citizens without a voice or means of representation 
in a political climate, which is already polarized and increasingly unrepresentative of 
even the average American.  
 
III. THE STATES AND CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
 
While public opinion on disenfranchisement has become less favorable, it is 
impossible to deny that the practice of disenfranchisement has been utilized for 
centuries in the United States.  Courts have incorporated the traditional roots of 
disenfranchisement into Western and U.S. jurisprudence, a primary reason for its 
acceptance as a practice, calling back to the concerns of the Founders—voting as a 
privilege rather than as a right.77  More recently, there have been calls from opponents 
of criminal disenfranchisement78 to change our views on voting, and to modify our 
understanding of the right to vote with the current values of society—a society which 
 
71 Id. at 70.  
72 Ben Peck, Testimony of Ben Peck, Senior Legislative and Policy Associate Demos Before the National 
Advisory Committee on Racial, Ethnic and Other Populations of the U.S. Census Bureau on: The Census Count 
and Prisoners: The problem, the solutions, and what the Census can do, DEMOS, 2 (Oct. 22, 2012), 
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/BenPeck_Testimony_PrisonBasedGerrymandering10121
2.pdf.  
73 Id. (stating that, at the state level, “[c]rediting incarcerated persons from all over the state to the 
predominately rural districts that contain large prisons enhances the weight of a vote in those districts, diluting 
all other votes in the state” and that “[i]ncarcerated persons are disproportionately Black and Latino, and . . . 
most prisons are built in disproportionately white areas.  Using Black and Latino prisoners to pad the 
populations of white legislative districts dilutes minority voting strength state-wide.”). 
74 Bryant & Cruz, supra note 53, at 66.  
75 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE STATISTICS: INMATE RACE, 
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
76  Bryant & Cruz, supra note 53, at 71 (stating that the basis of the right to vote as a human right is 
codified in United Nations Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).  
77 See KEYSSAR supra note 8, at 7-10.  
78 See sources cited infra note 102. 
  
90 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 46:1] 
no longer bans indentured servants, slaves, women, and men without land from voting.  
While many states have abused their power over the vote in the past, most states now 
offer a pathway for felons to regain voting rights, through the process of re-
enfranchisement.79  However, this process varies significantly from state to state.  A 
uniform national standard of re-enfranchisement would both be accepted by the 
majority of states and more efficient but has not yet been enacted. 
State approaches to felon disenfranchisement fall into four general categories.  
First, two states never revoke the right of felons to vote, at any point.80  Second, 
fourteen states and the District of Columbia disenfranchise felons for the duration of 
their incarceration, but automatically restore their right to vote upon release.81  Third, 
in twenty-two states, felons do not have the right to vote while incarcerated and for a 
varying time-period after their release.82  Most states denote this time-period as the 
duration of a felon’s parole or probation, with their rights being restored after that time 
period has been expired.  Some of these states also denote a requirement that a felon 
pay any applicable fines or restitution before regaining their right to vote.83  Finally, in 
twelve states, felons lose their right to vote indefinitely for crimes of certain severity—
only a pardon from the governor allows a felon who has committed one of these crimes 
to vote.84  Some states in this category also require that felons face a waiting period 
post-sentence, beginning only after their parole or probation.85  These waiting periods 
vary in duration but can be significant.  Additionally, some states that fall within this 
category allow the possibility of re-enfranchisement but require felons to request the 
re-instatement of their ability to vote, providing no constitutional or statutory 
guarantees that those rights will be restored by any means other than a gubernatorial 
pardon.86 
It is this last category of twelve states, which permanently ban felons who commit 
certain crimes from voting, that form the primary basis of concern for the inequality 
of disenfranchisement jurisprudence in the United States.87  The states that fall within 
the “possibility of re-enfranchisement” category are a varying patchwork of policy; 
some define a handful of serious violent felonies, white collar crimes, or sexual 
 
79 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States,  
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/2019.5.31_Criminal_Disenfranchisement_Map.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (hereinafter BRENNAN CENTER Disenfranchisement Map) (differentiating between 
(1) states that disenfranchise permanently, (2) disenfranchise at some individuals with criminal convictions, (3) 
restore voting rights upon completion of sentence requirements, (4) restore voting rights automatically after 
release from prison and discharge from parole, (5) restore voting rights after release from prison, and (5) do not 
disenfranchise any individuals with criminal convictions).  
80 Christopher Uggen et al., 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 4 
THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-
Lost-Voters.pdf; see also BRENNAN CENTER Disenfranchisement Map, supra note 79 (noting that this category 
amounts to permanent disenfranchisement for all individuals with felony convictions).   
81 Uggen et al., supra note 80, at 4. 
82 Id.  
83 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Felon Voting Rights: Restoration of Voting Rights 
for Felons, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 
2018).  
84 In these states, felons are entitled to ask for reinstatement of their voting rights, but the state has no 
obligation to grant their request.  Felons in these states generally remain disenfranchised unless there are special 
circumstances.  Uggen et al., supra note 80, at 4. 
85 Id. at 4, 12.  
86 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Disenfranchisement Map, supra note 79. 
87 These states are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
Wyoming, Iowa, and Kentucky.  Of these twelve states, Iowa and Kentucky permanently disenfranchise all 
individuals with felony convictions. Id.  
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offenses, while others use loose and undefined terminology.88  For example, the 
Alabama Constitution states that “[n]o person convicted of a felony involving moral 
turpitude . . . shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil and political rights . . . 
.”89  The reasons for the vague phrasing used in the document were discriminatorily 
motivated, allowing the government to loosely define crimes in such a way that 
minorities could be incarcerated and disenfranchised.90  There have historically been 
numerous instances of debate in both Alabama and other jurisdictions as to what 
constitutes a crime of moral turpitude.  An issue that Alabama sought to resolve by 
defining the crimes that fit under this designation in House Bill 282.91  The bill defines 
numerous violent felonies and serious crimes, such as certain types of child abuse, that 
entail a permanent revocation of voting rights.92  However, the statute also mandates 
permanent disenfranchisement for nonviolent offenses, ranging from the “[t]rafficking 
in cannabis, cocaine, or other illegal drugs . . .[,]” to theft of lost property and theft of 
trademarks or trade secrets.93  Kentucky and Iowa are examples of states that have the 
strictest disenfranchisement policies in this fourth category, which revoke voting rights 
for any “treason, felony . . . or [] . . . high misdemeanor . . . [,]”94 and any “infamous 
crime[,]”95 respectively.  In these two states, conviction of any felony imposes what is 
essentially an irrevocable lifetime ban on voting.  These bans are here to stay as well.  
In 2016, Iowa’s policy was affirmed by the state supreme court.96  These vaguely 
phrased policies remain a consistent issue for felons, who have continuously found 
themselves at the mercy of the subjective and often politically motivated 
interpretations of legislators. 
The issue with these varying state approaches rests primarily in their 
unpredictability, which has prevented states from changing their own laws even when 
branches of the state governments desire to do so.  For instance, when the Governor of 
Iowa attempted to change the law via executive order,97 felons with completed 
sentences were told that their rights had been restored only for those rights to be 
revoked again six years later when a new governor rescinded that executive order.98  
Moreover, the current patchwork system of disenfranchisement practices in the U.S. 
creates different standards in fifty different jurisdictions—standards which are in an 
unpredictable state of flux, changing as the political climates change, harming national 
uniformity in voting laws and voters in the process.  These issues create additional 
 
88 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 83.   
89 ALA. CONST. amend. 579(b). 
90 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (holding that Alabama’s moral turpitude provision 
was discriminatory motivated by noting “the delegates to the all-white [1901] convention were not secretive 
about their purpose,” to “establish white supremacy in this State”). 
91 See generally H.B. 282, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2017). 
92 Id. at §2(c)(10)-(15), (32), (38)-(39).  
93 Id. at §2(c)(35), (43), (44).  
94 Id. See also KY. CONST. § 145 (stating “[p]ersons convicted . . . of treason, or felony, or bribery in an 
election, or of such high misdemeanor as the General Assembly may declare shall operate as an exclusion from 
the right of suffrage . . . .”).  
95 Id.  See also IOWA CONST. art. 2, § 5 (stating “[n]o . . . person convicted of any infamous crime[] shall 
be entitled to the privilege of an elector.”).  
96 Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 205 (Iowa 2016) (upholding ban on felon voting by holding that all 
felonies are categorized as “infamous crime[s]” meriting permanent disenfranchisement).  
97 See State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 2017) (upholding the ability of the governor to restore 
voting rights to persons convicted of infamous crimes through pardoning power—his holding does not prevent 
future governors from revoking those restorations at their discretion). 
98 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Iowa, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-iowa (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).  
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difficulties for felons, who are being sent mixed messages about the status of their right 
to vote.  Such issues could potentially lead to voter apathy in a demographic that 
accounts for nearly five million Americans. 
Additionally, permanent and effectively permanent disenfranchisement practices 
have genuine and harmful effects in local communities.  In Iowa, one in five African 
Americans are ineligible to vote due to a past felony.99  These individuals are 
prohibited from voting regardless of their completion of incarceration and probation.  
They hold jobs and are taxpayers, but yet are entirely unable to influence the policy 
direction of their children’s schools, local taxation, and policing practices.  They are 
entirely unable to hold public officials accountable, and are chronically unrepresented 
in political discussions, owing largely to their lack of power at the polls.  Such effects 
trickle down to families, where parents are unable to act as proper role models for 
children and demonstrate proper participation in the political process.100  Furthermore, 
the effects of underrepresentation are amplified in jurisdictions where minorities are 
already marginalized.  Incarceration practices, which disproportionately impact 
minorities, also weaken their share of representation in districts where minority 
communities face already-low proportions of demographic representation.101  
But public opinion is changing on this issue.102  Support for national uniformity of 
disenfranchisement provisions has gained significant national momentum, with the 
rapid growth of incarceration rates causing more Americans to challenge what had 
once been a settled area of law.  In 2018, there had been a push to restore voting rights 
to felons at the state level.  For example, executive actions restored the right to vote 
for parolees in New York.103  In Florida, a grassroots campaign succeeded in amending 
the state constitution, removing the permanent ban on voting for felons in that state 
and restoring the rights of nearly 1.4 million disenfranchised Floridians after 
accumulating over 800,000 signatures.104 
Further, Louisiana passed a law restoring rights to felons who are on probation or 
parole but remained un-incarcerated for five years.105  Importantly, the law allows 
citizens who served probation without being imprisoned to vote.  Re-enfranchisement 
organizations in Louisiana have also sought to expand voting rights for felons in the 
 
99 Bonnie Pitz, Permanent Disenfranchisement Hurts Families and Communities, THE DES MOINES 
REGISTER (Sept. 23, 2016, 2:56 PM) 
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/abetteriowa/2016/09/23/permanent-disenfranchisement-
hurts-families-and-communities/90848580/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
100 Id.  See also Eric Plutzer, Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Young 
Adulthood, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41 (2002) (discussing the effect of habitual voting by parents on young 
children’s development of active voting habits).  
101 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, IOWA 2010: SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS: 2010 
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 116-117 (2012) ftp://ftp2.census.gov/library/publications/2012/dec/cph-
1-17.pdf (noting that Iowa is racially composed of 88.7% non-Hispanic Caucasians compared to 2.9% Black or 
African American residents). 
102 Jeff Manza et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 275 PUB. 
OPINION Q., VOL. 68 NO. 2, 280-281 (2004) (finding a rate of over 60% support for re-enfranchising parolees 
and/or probationers); see also John Laloggia, Conservative Republicans are least supportive of making it easy 
for everyone to vote, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: FACT TANK (Oct. 31 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/10/31/conservative-republicans-are-least-supportive-of-making-it-easy-for-everyone-to-vote/ (noting 
that “[t]wo thirds of Americans (67%) say everything possible should be done to make it easy for every citizen 
to vote”). 
103 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION EFFORTS IN NEW YORK, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-new-york (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).  
104 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION EFFORTS IN FLORIDA, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-florida (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
105 See H.B. 265, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018). 
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state by challenging the meaning of the word “imprisonment” as it is defined in the 
state constitution.106  These organizations argued that numerous disenfranchised 
citizens do not fall within the plain meaning of “imprisonment” as stated in the 
disenfranchisement provisions of the state constitution.107  Though the case arguing 
this position ultimately lost on appeal, the Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court noted in her dissenting opinion that she disagreed with the state’s practices, 
noting that the Plaintiff’s argument was indeed sufficient on the merits.108  
These examples serve a simple purpose.  They demonstrate that the climate is 
optimal for the federal government to create a uniform national standard for voter 
disenfranchisement practices.  Laws at the state level are confusing and disunified.  
They serve a historical purpose, which is no longer acceptable and lies in foundations 
of discriminatory policy from an era where inclusiveness was a threat to those in 
power.  These provisions have been used to oppress and disempower minority groups, 
ensuring that their voice in government is limited and their ability to participate in the 
civic process reduced. 
The federal government is more receptive to a change in dynamic as well, with 
House Democrats prioritizing significant reforms for voting rights, such as voter 
registration, intended to restore much of the VRA’s power that was lost in the Supreme 
Court’s 2013 decision in Holder.109  Advocacy organizations have begun pushing the 
federal government for the revision of disenfranchisement practices as well, endorsing 
legislation at the federal level that seeks to restore the voting rights of felons at the 
national level in federal elections.110  
 
IV. REMEDYING THE ISSUE 
 
While federal control of criminal disenfranchisement practices in federal elections 
is an ideal solution to the historical, racial, and communal issues arising from state 
control over disenfranchisement, the form that such a solution might take is itself an 
important topic of analysis.  Though its history and past purposes are controversial, the 
designation of disenfranchisement powers has played an important historical role in 
regulating the balance of power between the federal government and the states.  
Allowing the states to determine how they composed their electorates was seen as key 
to ensuring that a more powerful federal government was appointed only by state-
endorsed electors.111  Unfortunately, a long history of state-level abuse of these powers 
 
106 Voice of the Ex-Offender v. State, 249 S.3d 857 (La. App. 2018), writ denied, 255 So. 3d 575. 
107 Voice of the Ex-Offender, 249 S.3d 857; see also Kwame Akosah, Fighting for the Right to Vote in 
Louisiana, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 26 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/fighting-right-
vote-louisiana.  
108 Voice of the Ex-Offender v. State, 255 So. 3d 575, 576-78 (La. App. 2018) (The Chief Justice wrote in 
dissent: “There is no legitimate reason for disenfranchising these citizens. Voting is a fundamental right in 
America, yet tens of thousands of Louisiana citizens are impact by Louisiana’s felony disenfranchisement 
Laws.” and that “[T]he clear language of [the Louisiana] constitution already provides the right to vote to all 
probationers and parolees because they are not incarcerated.”).  
109 Zach Montellaro, House passes sweeping election reform bill, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2019, 11:23 AM) 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/08/house-passes-sweeping-election-reform-bill-1212693 (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2019) (detailing the “For the People Act” passed by House Democrats in 2019 which, among other 
measures, expanded early voting, instituted redistricting reform, and sought to implement automatic voter 
registration, while noting the unlikelihood of the bill’s passage in the Senate).  
110 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Democracy Restoration Act Fact Sheet, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/DRA%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (discussing proposed 
Senate Bill 772 and House Bill 1459). 
111 See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 18-20.  
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as well as more evolved societal and legal conceptions toward voting rights provide a 
convincing argument for the application of broader federal regulation of criminal 
disenfranchisement.  While states have retained their power to disenfranchise voters, 
they have done so only at the behest of Congress, who is under no legal compulsion to 
allow states to maintain these powers.  Should it choose to do so, Congress holds 
constitutional authority to regulate elections and remedy the violation of rights as it 
sees appropriate.   
Legislative action is the clear path to successful, longstanding reform.  Without 
considering potential questions of constitutionality that would arise from an executive 
order, executive action is unreliable.  It shares similar inconsistent traits with state 
attitudes towards disenfranchisement and is vulnerable to sudden revocation at the 
behest of any new president.  Judicial action is also unreliable.  Judicial authority lies 
primarily in interpretation and has largely disfavored the federal government in 
questions of statewide powers to disenfranchise criminals.  However, while the 
judiciary has largely endorsed states’ power to disenfranchise, it has also largely 
endorsed congressional authority to legislate on electoral matters—including 
legislative decisions involving the right to vote.112   
Legislation to remedy this issue has already been introduced in Congress.  In 2015, 
Senator Ben Cardin and Representative John Conyers introduced the Democracy 
Restoration Act of 2015 (“DRA”) as S. 772113 and H.R. 1459114 respectively.  The bill 
is specifically intended to reinstate voting rights for former criminal offenders in 
federal elections, after incarceration.115  The Second Section116 of the bill establishes 
congressional authority to legislate on disenfranchisement, and details congressional 
findings as to the numerous injustices and negative effects of statewide 
disenfranchisement practices.  The most important provisions of the DRA are located 
in Section 3 of the text.  They read: 
 
The right of an individual who is a citizen of the United States to vote in any 
election for Federal office shall not be denied or abridged because that 
individual has been convicted of a criminal offense unless such individual is 
serving a felony sentence in a correctional institution or facility at the time 
of the election.117 
 
112 See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Legal Analysis of Congress’ Constitutional Authority to Restore 
Voting Rights, (Aug. 3, 2009). 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Brennan%20Center%20analysis%20of%2
0DRA%20federal%20authority%208-10-09.pdf (hereinafter BRENNAN DRA Legality Analysis); see also Kusper 
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 n.11 (1973); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 121, 124 (1970). 
113 Democracy Restoration Act, S. 772, 114th Cong. (2015). 
114 Democracy Restoration Act, H.R. 1459, 114th Cong. (2015) (stating, among other findings, that (1) the 
right to vote is a basic act of citizenship, (2) Congress has ultimate power to supervise federal elections, (3) 
stating the constitutional bases of those powers, (4) identifying three areas where State laws regarding criminal 
convictions make elections unfair, (5) evaluating the types of disenfranchisement used by states and criticizing 
them, (6) acknowledging and statistically supporting the link between disenfranchisement and race and, (7) 
expanding on the negative future impact of such practices) (Hereinafter DRA OF 2015).  
115 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Democracy Restoration Act Fact Sheet, supra note 110. 
116 DRA OF 2015, § 2 (establishing the right to vote as a basic act of citizenship, Congressional power to 
supervise elections, basic principles of fairness embodied in the constitution forbidding abridgement of the right 
to vote, discussing discrepancies in State disenfranchisement laws, discussing racial disparities in incarceration, 
discussing disproportionate effect on minorities, and discussing negative impact of criminal disenfranchisement 
on communities). 
117 DRA OF 2015, § 3. 
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While Congress has historically delegated the power of choosing eligible voters 
to the states, the federal legislature does have the authority to ultimately rescind those 
powers.  Congressional ability to regulate federal elections is historically expansive, 
and is grounded primarily in the Election Clause of the Constitution,118 which reads:  
 
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, 
except as the Places of chusing [sic] Senators. 
 
The Election Clause has been interpreted broadly by courts,119 and “include[s] 
Congress’ authority to regulate presidential elections, as well as its authority to 
regulate other voting requirements for federal elections, including voter eligibility.”120  
In Oregon v. Mitchell,121 the Supreme Court held that Congress has a universal power 
to supervise the federal election process, which includes its choice of criteria for voter 
eligibility.122  Additionally, where the DRA directly conflicts with state laws regarding 
criminal-disenfranchisement, the Constitution’s Article VI Supremacy Clause123 
would apply—ensuring that any conflicting provisions in state statutes or constitutions 
are stricken and replaced by DRA provisions.  Potential limitations on broad 
congressional authority to regulate voter-eligibility have been interpreted more 
narrowly by courts,124 and would have no significant limiting effect on the federal 
legislature’s authority to implement a uniform national standard for criminal-
disenfranchisement practices.  Thus, federal legislation banning the use of criminal 
disenfranchisement practices would not be found unconstitutional on these grounds.  
Should Congress’s power to pass the DRA under the Election Clause be 
challenged, Congress has a second avenue of passage.  Congress has been given a 
broad mandate by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to remedy the ills of 
racism in our voting practices,125 undertones, and overt exercises of which have been 
discussed extensively in the previous sections of this Note.  Congress has the power to 
 
118 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4(2)   
119 See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 n.11 (1973); see also BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, 
Legal Analysis of Congress’ Constitutional Authority to Restore Voting Rights at 1, (Aug. 3, 2009) 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Brennan%20Center%20analysis%20of%2
0DRA%20federal%20authority%208-10-09.pdf (hereinafter BRENNAN DRA Legality Analysis). 
120 BRENNAN DRA Legality Analysis at 1. 
121 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 121, 124 (1970). The court was divided between Congressional 
enforcement powers or the Election Clause as the source of Congressional authority in this case but were not 
divided on the ultimate finding of Congressional authority to regulate voting requirements. Id. 
122 Id. at 124. 
123 U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme law of the land . . . .”). 
124 BRENNAN DRA Legality Analysis at 2 (examining arguments against the DRA utilizing the scope of the 
Qualifications Clauses of Article I in the constitution providing that “qualifications of voters in congressional 
elections must be the same as the qualifications for voters in . . . the state legislature[,]” explaining that such 
arguments contradict Supreme Court precedent regarding the scope of the Qualifications Clause); see also U.S. 
CONST. art. I, Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (holding that the Qualifications Clause was 
not drafted to limit congressional power and interpreting the clause to mean that any voters eligible to vote in a 
state election should also be permitted to vote in Federal elections).  
125 BRENNAN DRA Legality Analysis at 2 (stating that the right to vote without racial discrimination is a 
fundamental right, emphasizing that Supreme Court precedent grants broad authority to remove racially-
motivated discrimination in voting practices). 
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enforce its provisions “by appropriate legislation.”126  This power has been interpreted 
broadly by the Supreme Court,127 and grants Congress significant leverage in deciding 
the appropriate measures of voter-eligibility.  These broader interpretations of 
congressional authority in setting voter-eligibility requirements are arguably owed to 
the changed perception of what voting “really is.”  Public and practical understandings 
of the voting process view it as a fundamental right of all Americans, rather than a 
privilege to be arbitrarily manipulated by the states. 
Because voting rights are now largely viewed as fundamental, especially when 
issues of racial discrimination are involved, legislation which demonstrates a 
“proportionality between the injury to be prevented . . . and the means adopted to that 
end”128 falls well within the federal legislature’s prerogative to implement and enforce.  
In order to pass judicial tests of enforcement authority, Congress need only to: (1) 
identify a constitutional right which requires enforcement, and (2) provide remedial 
legislation to remedy past violations of this constitutional right that are appropriate and 
proportional to the rights that have been violated as well as the manner in which they 
are violated.129  Court analyses in this area of law are traditionally on a “sliding scale” 
rather than rigidly applied.130  However, Congress’s authority to enforce its laws has 
been most expansive when its intention is to remedy discriminatory or racially 
motivated practices.131  
Importantly, congressional power to remedy past constitutional violations under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments is generally limited to constitutionally 
protected classes or fundamental rights.132  Legislative authority to remedy 
constitutional violations stemming from grounds other than discrimination against 
protected classes and fundamental rights are often evaluated more strictly and less 
favorably by courts.133  In implementing any legislation to combat the issue of criminal 
disenfranchisement, especially legislation forbidding the practice entirely at the state 
and federal level, it is vital that Congress compiles and presents evidence linking the 
historical use of both incarceration and criminal disenfranchisement to the 
disempowerment of  minority groups and communities (this link is established and 
acknowledged extensively in the text of the DRA134).135  The legislature must 
 
126 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2; see also U.S. CONST. AMEND. XV § 5. 
127 See, e.g., Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518, 520 (2004) (describing Congressional enforcement powers 
as broad).  
128 See, e.g., Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
129 Lane, supra note 127, at 520 (elaborating on the test utilized by courts to evaluate when Congressional 
authority is most and least expansive).  
130 Id. at 523.  
131 See, e.g. S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (stating that Congressional powers to enforce 
are at their height when legislation acting on the 15th Amendment is centered upon fundamental rights, such as 
the right to vote, and the rights of protected classes). 
132 See BRENNAN DRA Legality Analysis at 3 (citing Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (holding that the Americans with disabilities act is unenforceable against state 
governments when its aims were incomparable to the Voting Rights Act)).  
133  See, e.g. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Congress did not possess the 
authority to enforce provisions of the Age Discrimination Act against state-level governments, using voting 
rights protection as an example of legitimate use of Congressional powers).  
134 See DRA OF 2015 at § 2 (“State disenfranchisement laws disproportionately impact racial and ethnic 
minorities. Eight percent of the African-American population . . . are disenfranchised.  Given current rates of 
incarceration . . . 1 in 3 of the next generation of African-American men will be disenfranchised as some point 
during their lifetime.”).  
135 BRENNAN DRA Legality Analysis at 3, see generally Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) 
(invalidating an Alabama statute and holding that there was an improper motivation regarding race and a 
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demonstrate that race-based discrimination was a motivating factor in adopting 
specific felon disenfranchisement laws at the state level, or in the absence of race-
based motivation, that facially neutral laws are enforced discriminatorily.  Legislators 
can easily satisfy these requirements through even a cursory look to past renditions of 
these laws, their legislative histories, and the historical contexts surrounding their 
promulgation.  
In sum, any legislation that intends to remedy the wrongs of past practices in felon-
disenfranchisement laws can most likely be implemented through the Election Clause.  
If Election Clause powers are interpreted more narrowly, Congress can still implement 
re-enfranchisement legislation through its enforcement powers in the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.  However, to do so, the Legislature must prove a link between 
state disenfranchisement laws and racially discriminatory intentions behind the 
implementation of those laws or, in the case of facially neutral laws, their enforcement.  
Congress must also specify the right being enforced, such as a specific fundamental 
right to vote and participate in American democracy.  Before the passage of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, such arguments would have been more 
difficult to make.  However, the passage of these amendments established the right to 
vote as a fundamental American right that must not be denied on the basis of race.  The 
amendments’ intentions are apparent from an interpretation of the plain meaning of 
their texts, which specifically connote voting as a right rather than a privilege.  The 
phrasing of these amendments should be rightly construed as a direct constitutional 
endorsement of the legislature’s authority to enforce that right.  
 Though the DRA (and other legislation like it) is likely to withstand legal scrutiny, 
reform legislation would still face significant political challenges in securing passage 
through Congress and, ultimately, the president’s desk.  Reform legislation for 
disenfranchisement has gained traction nationally but is still largely opposed by 
Republicans.136  Under a Republican president and Senate, the DRA would face 
significant challenges—it is unlikely that it would be passed in its current form, but 
Republicans have shown a willingness to reform criminal policies.  With the passage 
of the First Step Act137 in December of 2018, Republicans signaled that they may be 
willing to participate in criminal justice and prison reform.  However, 
disenfranchisement is a more controversial issue for Republicans.  Democrats may find 
themselves waiting for successful campaigns in 2020 before approaching the issue in 
full force.  Additionally, the priority that reform legislation will take for Democrats 
remains an active question.  The party has previewed an ambitious and expansive 
legislative agenda, seeking to tackle a variety of high-profile issues ranging from 
healthcare to wealth inequality.138  
Reform is a difficult and often controversial process.  The Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments are themselves a direct contravention of the views of our Founders on 
the nature of voting, serving as an important reminder that the views of the Founders 
are not infallible.  As attitudes change, laws must change with them.  More modern 
conceptions of voting rights should rightfully be seen as a positive evolution of 
 
demonstrated racially discriminatory impact).  
136 See Laloggia, supra note 102.  
137 FIRST Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391 (2018) (Bipartisan legislation passed by a Senate vote of 87-
12 with goal of reducing recidivism, including numerous provisions aimed at doing so). 
138 In word searches of Democratic presidential candidate social media account, top issues include Health 
Care, Foreign Policy, Climate Change and Social Justice.  In a Washington Post survey, voting reform did not 
appear as an individual policy item.  See Kevin Schaul & Kevin Uhrmacher, The issues 2020 Democrats are 
running on, according to their social media, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 24, 2019) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy-2020/priorities-issues/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).  
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American perception on what it truly means to participate in our democracy and, 
ultimately, what it means to be an American.  
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
The concepts and values behind criminal disenfranchisement run deep in human 
history.  They have evolved from ancient classical societies, adapted to European 
models of governance and, ultimately, been applied in the United States.  Just as 
disenfranchisement practices have evolved for good and for ill, so too have societal 
attitudes about what it means to vote.  For much of history, voting was seen not as a 
fundamental right, but as a privilege granted by the state.  This conception was carried 
over by the Founders upon the creation of the United States.  That conception, one 
which was deeply rooted in a fear of the common man and slave, has changed 
significantly.  
Disenfranchisement powers were granted to states as a component of federalism, 
allowing them to have an indirect say in the composition of the federal government 
that would ultimately control them.  Unfortunately, many states abused these great 
powers, utilizing them to marginalize and silence the voices of minority groups—often 
not as an unintended side-effect, but as a purposeful consequence of policy.  Statewide 
policies continue to have a disproportionate impact on minorities, who have been 
targeted by discriminatory policies of incarceration and face lasting negative impacts 
in their communities and generations.  
State disenfranchisement powers are impractical and fickle.  They are subject to 
change on the whims of governors, legislatures, and judiciaries, each with their own 
competing agendas.  Further, the difficulty of limiting the variance in state election 
laws is effectively multiplied by fifty as individual states constantly change 
disenfranchisement policies—making a uniform national standard nearly impossible 
to achieve.  States are absolutely entitled to autonomy in their own matters and in 
deciding who may vote in statewide elections.  However, in federal elections with 
national implications that affect each and every state in the Union, disenfranchisement 
powers are best allocated to the federal government.  Principles of federalism are not 
compromised here—Congress remains a composition of state-elected representatives 
and senators.  
The United States continues its march towards a vision of equality worthy of the 
words on its founding document.  Positive attitudes toward the implementation of 
national standards on felon disenfranchisement have increased nationally.  Congress 
is poised to do just so, with bills such as the Democracy Restoration Act having been 
introduced and, post-2018 midterms, facing probable consideration in the House of 
Representatives.  As discussed in Part III of this Note, Congress has well-documented 
legal grounds to regulate federal elections, especially when Constitutionally 
guaranteed rights are being compromised, rights which have long been undermined by 
state-controlled disenfranchisement policy.  The political challenges of passing 
legislation like the DRA are far less certain in our modern political landscape, which 
is anything but predictable.  
Ultimately, it is time for disenfranchisement policies to adapt for more modern 
definitions of voting as a right.  If incarceration is seen as a debt paid to society for 
crimes committed, those debts must be considered paid-in-full after the sentence is 
fully served.  Felons are still citizens, and deserve to be treated as such, including a 
full restoration of their right to participate in the democratic processes that serve as a 
cornerstone our uniquely American democratic process.  As it stands, committing a 
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felony in the United States amounts to what is essentially a life sentence of half-
citizenship.  Disenfranchisement practices are at the center of these unfair standards, 
serving to erode democracy by marginalizing disproportionately represented 
minorities in the criminal justice system.  
While it was not a central vision of the Founders to acknowledge voting as a right 
rather than a privilege, their goal was to create a nation of equal men and women, each 
working to create a nation composed of equal and just laws.  Attitudes of rights and 
privileges evolve and change through the mechanisms of government implemented by 
the Founders for exactly that purpose.  Just as the VRA secured the rights of oppressed 
minorities to participate in the democratic process, the time has come for new 
legislation and policy that ensures Americans who have paid their debts to society are 
welcomed back to their country, society, and civic processes wholeheartedly—not as 
felons, but as fully-fledged American citizens. 
